It is important to remember how Mr. Silver made much of all of the potential problems for Donald Trump but ignored the dynamics that help him. There are quite a few, and a lot of them complement each other nicely. It is important to note that stages of Doom 1 and 2, which Mr. Silver gave Mr. Trump only a 25% chance of surviving, have already been hurdled. Trump’s six strengths will make it much easier for him to survive each stage, and some stages may never come into effect.
Decision will come swiftly
As everyone knows, the voting begins in Iowa on February 1st. We’ll turn to the stage of doom Silver identifies as Iowa/New Hampshire in a bit. But what people focus on less is that by March 15th, 31 states will have voted. This six-week window of voting will go by in a flash with very little time for buyer’s remorse. Silver’s last two stages of Doom, delegate accumulation and a pre-convention end game, simply may not happen as a clear win is possible before then. These stages won’t materialize if a candidate were to win say 25 of the 31 states. Speed can kill.
The Democratic process in 2008 was over with just such speed. While the process had the appearance of dragging on, the math of the Democratic primaries resolved the contest on Feb 19th if not the 12th. From that point on, no realistic set of electoral outcomes existed for the Clinton campaign that could save her from mathematical extinction. [The Democratic super delegate drama provided some false hope but would have been very hard for Hillary. Trump’s rivals have no such luxury.]
The rapid fire of states also makes Silver’s vaunted “winnowing” a much greater challenge than is generally understood. The polling now says winnowing to only one rival is needed to beat Trump. But even if we grant that a field reduction to only two Trump challengers might be enough to defeat him, and we grant that this takes place relatively quickly, the most likely prompt winnowing to Trump, Cruz and Rubio might be less effective in stopping Trump than perceived. An amazing perspective on this can again be pulled from 2008. John Edwards dropped out of the race after getting 14% of the vote in Florida, but the number 14% is incredibly important because it is 1% less than the viability threshold required to receive delegates. This convinced John Edwards to quit as his votes would be wasted later on. His departure was a week before Super Tuesday. Both California and Connecticut voted that day. In California Edwards received 4% of the vote; in Connecticut it was only 1%. These were two relatively divided states and ones in which there are no real pockets of Democrats who are no longer behavioral Democrats [Like Kentucky or Oklahoma]. The reason Edwards did so much better in California than in Connecticut was primarily driven by absentee ballots. Connecticut has few; whereas California has many. Early voting could very much be a problem for the winnowing of candidate. A week or more of lag time is required for full winnowing, and in places such as Florida, with early vote, it might even be more.
The fact is March 1st is a huge day in the process, and it follows South Carolina by only 10 days. Thus candidates who fight on to South Carolina even if they winnow afterwards will not fall completely to zero. There is little time for reflection. Candidates who have not broken through by March 15th will have an almost impossible time. Indeed, it will be difficult if the breakthroughs don’t come on March 1. Thus speed may eliminate two stages of doom and hinder the ability of a third to take down Trump. Of course the stage at Iowa and New Hampshire remains, but there too things seem to be going swimmingly for Mr. Trump.
Multi-Candidate field dynamics:
This is where things get really crazy. Because of the establishment thinking, including that of Nate Silver, there is a firm belief embedded deeply in the heart of almost every single campaign on the Republican side. Let’s call it the reverse bear trick.
You know the story: Imagine two people being chased by a bear. One person knows that safety resides not necessarily in outrunning the bear but more in outrunning the other person. In this case, every campaign seems to be of the opinion that if they can get their guy (or gal in the case of Ms. Fiorina) to be the last person standing against Donald Trump, the path to victory will be nearly certain. As a result of this belief no one quite yet is focusing his fire on Donald Trump. Instead, they are mostly attacking each other. When you look at this strategy from each candidate’s point of view, it makes sense from the singular vantage point of increasing an individual’s chance of winning. But such thinking also dramatically increases the odds of victory for Donald Trump.
Ted Cruz:
Senator Cruz seems to be in the absolutely best position of anyone not named Donald Trump. It remains a tossup in Iowa, and if Ted Cruz wins there he becomes an instant contender. South Carolina and the states on March 1st line up well for him as second act. However there is a hidden danger for Cruz. Doing too well against Donald Trump too early can give the Republican establishment time to rally around a champion, and, as will be later explained, delegate selection rules provide additional reasons for Cruz to want Trump doing well early in the race. The assumption made in the Cruz camp is that the threat of Trump will potentially force, a Republican Establishment, which despises Cruz, into acceptance of him. Cruz needs to be beat Trump, yes, but he also needs the looming threat of Trump starting with Michigan on March 8th all the way through California on June 3rd or the Establishment wing will fight back.
Marco Rubio:
Rubio’s third place in the national polling provides him with the exact mirror concerns to those of Cruz. He has nowhere near the equivalent safety net, yet his party line is slightly more convincing. Rubio’s team observes that the Republican Establishment has in the end always gotten the nominee it wanted or was at least comfortable with. Why should this time be different? Rubio plans to use Iowa and New Hampshire to clear the field of everyone but him, Cruz and Trump. This is where Trump becomes useful to Rubio. Given the March 1st calendar there is a significant danger for Rubio that if Trump were too badly weakened early, then Cruz would be well positioned to win nearly everywhere. Rubio hopes for his moment when Cruz fails to beat Trump. Rubio’s approach might also be a subtle acknowledgment that the party has swung dramatically to the right and thus there is a need for a divided right in order for a more moderate candidate to win.
The New Hampshire Strategy Governors:
Bush, Christie, and Kasich all have a strategy somewhat similar to Rubio’s, except weaker because they have no easy way to get rid of Rubio. Each of them believes that a second place finish behind Donald Trump in New Hampshire is completely in reach. Each of them believes that just by finishing ahead of the other two, the winner would go a long way to becoming the only deeply experienced candidate left in the field, and thus the one true grown-up who will win in the end. Trump is incredibly helpful to them as well because his presence might put a fear of him deep into the heart of Republicans who will look for someone tough to beat him. They can even dream that Trump and not Cruz will Iowa and thus weaken all other opposition to Trump besides the last standing Governor. If Trump was not around there would be genuine risk that Cruz could cruise. Thus the governors too everyone but Trump as their key problem.
How it plays out:
Because of these dynamics there is basically no interest on the part of any of these other campaigns in seriously messing with Trump in the first two states. Some of the campaigns’ calculations will be explained in greater detail in the math section. But as we have observed, with occasional brief exception, no one other than Rand Paul has shows a serious desire to mess with Trump. If no one is prepared to take on Trump in Iowa or New Hampshire because it is not in their interest then this stage, which Silver has identified, goes from a key challenge to a cakewalk.
This early period has thus also played into Trump’s hands because the opportunities for the candidates to winnow the field have produced damage to all and not much of a boost for any. For while the candidates have had good reason not to go after Trump, they have every single reason in the world to go after each other. This is particularly true for everyone in the Establishment lane (i.e. not as much for Cruz). Perhaps they will sort it all out by New Hampshire, but a current read on the polls says that will be very hard to do. In fact rather than settling anything New Hampshire could resolve nothing, leaving all six candidates still fighting. It is hard to imagine the highest voting Governor not going on to at least South Carolina. The better the highest Governor does, the more likely he is to continue to South Carolina. And the closeness in the results further enhances the risk of two or more establishment candidates soldiering on to March 1st. Such a result, which appears to be a fatal path for all the Establishment candidates may also be unavoidable for the Establishment. The depth of this problem comes into even greater focus when looking at delegate math.
It’s all about delegates
For simplicity’s sake, let’s consider only the State of Texas, remembering that there are similar rules in a number of states. Texas is the second largest delegate prize awarding 152 delegates. There are two categories of delegates, 44 delegates who are based upon the statewide primary vote, and the remainder chosen in 36 individual districts. Those decided at the statewide level can be divided three ways. If a candidate receives 50%, he or she wins and captures this entire bloc of delegates. Of course Ted Cruz would love to do this, but given the nature of the field this seems very unlikely. If no one receives 50%, these 44 delegates will be divided amongst those who reach 20% of all ballots cast. [A third remote scenario is than no one receives 20%, in which case a proportional split would take place. This seems extremely unlikely. The 20% rule means that at most four candidates can earn Texas at large delegates (excluding here the unicorn outcome of a 5 ways split at 20% each). The 20% threshold is a potential disaster for the Establishment Republicans because if more than one of them makes it to Texas, then both might be looking at a goose egg. Remember that even candidates already out of the race (aforementioned Zombie candidates) are likely to draw votes as we saw when zombie candidates received nearly 20% in the 2012 Republican race and even 2% in the 2008 Democratic primary, despite the then fierce struggle between Obama and Clinton.
Even in the best case for Rubio he is looking at 12 of the 44 at large delegates. If Bush follows him to Texas, then 0 could be far more likely. The district level delegates,which make up 71% of all delegates, present even more wild scenarios. If someone gets 50% in a district, he or she gets all three delegate. If no one does, the winner gets 2 and the loser gets 1. Given the dynamics of the race, Ted Cruz absolutely wants Donald Trump to follow Cruz and come in second in every district in Texas. Cruz would like to reach 50 in some districts and grab all the delegates. But there is another consideration for an overall nomination strategy that remembers the reverse bear theory. If Cruz get 50% and takes all the delegates in half the districts, but the Establishment takes second place in the other half then the Establishment gets 36 delegates. Alternatively, if Cruz never gets to 50% but wins all the districts and Trump comes in second everywhere, then yes Cruz gets fewer delegates but the Establishment candidates get none. Given that Cruz has every hope of denying the Establishment a viable alternative so as to force his selection over Trump’s he would prefer the Cruz/Trump result in every district. We can’t say now how the Texas Trump delegates would break down if their favorite candidate were vanquished. But what the polling and the impact of multiple candidate field dynamics show is that a Texas delegation devoid of anything but a Cruz or Trump delegate is a distinct possibility.
The other properly coined SEC states on Super Tuesday have similar rules, and thus doom for the Establishment may begin to set in then. Moreover, after two wins in a row (NV is a wild card which might boost others but may also just fall flat as some states vote so close to it) Trump could sweep the states on March 1st, with the possible exception of Texas. Indeed, right now he is predictably favored in every non-Texas SEC state after potential New Hampshire and South Carolina wins (See below for further explanation of how these dynamics have worked in the past).
Much Better Organizational skills than we thought.
To some degree we have been underestimating Trump’s logistical skills. Silver’s Stage 5 of Doom highlighted potential ballot failures and disorganization in accumulation of delegates. Yet the most recent Iowa polls are instructive. Trump is battling mightily in a state where organization is key. He might not win, but his organization seems to be performing well enough. In 2012 we saw lots of ballot access problems for candidates, including in Virginia, where all but two campaigns missed the ballot and some candidates had other issues. Trump has had no problems on this front. In fact he was first to file for the WV ballot, which is a May 10th state.
Even Trump’s campaign schedule, which might seem odd to some, reveals a clear understanding of the calendar, that may be more sophisticated than that of any other candidate. Pundits speculated on why is Trump campaigned in Vermont. The answer is simple. Vermont is a March 1st state. Trump is gaining a leap on people in the other states with the free media that his big rallies bring. The market is already saturated in Iowa and New Hampshire. Other candidates can’t get much coverage beyond the first few states, but Trump can. He always targets the right regions of every state to visit, hitting second tier markets where lots of Republicans are but are often ignored. Examples include Lowell and Worcester, Massachusetts, and Grand Rapids Michigan (a March 8th state but one which could break the back of the Republican Establishment before their dream of Ohio/Illinois/Florida day one week later). If you read his press releases he is also rolling out hires and teams in all of these states, and contrary to the myth that he does not have access to Data, he does. There are no doubt better political teams. But the organizational hurdles that Silver thought might take Trump down after March 15th might not prove fatal for two reasons. 1) political gravity might not let things go much past March 15 th; and 2) Trump’s organization is simply not that weak.
The media “love” of him.
The truth of this one is particularly harsh. Lots of people find politics boring and Trump fun. Even people who would never dream of voting for him often enjoy his antics. The maelstrom of coverage creates its own intoxicating vortex that is just drawing people in (note that this piece is not about Martin O’Malley). Trump has ridden a wave of unceasing media attention, but there was always sort of a caveat. Many journalists just assumed Trump had to end. Yet maybe has the influence of journalists on Trump’s long run prospects backwards. A Trump win in New Hampshire could take the Trump coverage to the absolute stratosphere as it becomes “ real.” The gap from New Hampshire to South Carolina is 11 days; and the March 1 Super Tuesday is only 10 days after than. Yes there is Nevada, but the Silver State might not truly change the trajectory coming only three days after South Carolina. We have no idea how massive the media machine could be. Silver cited it as possible source of explosion; yet it seems like it could be a hydrogen bomb after New Hampshire.
No Donors:
President Obama’s biggest gaffe in 2008 was made when trying to explain to rich people why ordinary earners voted Republican. It was at a fundraiser that the audience heard about bitter people clinging to guns and religion. Mitt Romney’s most egregious misstep in 2012 was made when trying to explain to rich people why the less well off voted Democratic. This also took place at a fundraiser. The list goes on and on. Courting money causes political mistakes amidst a desire for more money. It is also a mental stressor and time consuming: Donor happiness, Donor Relations, Donor Maintenance. It can slowly begin to change how you think and act. Donald Trump’s freedom from fundraising places him in an incredibly advantageous position. While to some degree self-financing has a lousy track record, that comes in large part because of the problems inherent in explaining where the money came from. In Trump’s case everyone has a rough idea how he got so rich. Rather than try and be humble he luxuriates in his wealth. Thus attacking him on it with Mitt Romney Bain Style ads seems doomed to fail. Trump’s lack of need for donors gives him the freedom to say what he likes and also extra time not available on other candidates’ schedules.
Conclusion:
The many hidden Trump advantages are not only powerful in isolation; they feed off each other. The compression of the schedule and the hidden factor of candidates receiving votes even after they are gone (“zombies”) raises the bar on an Establishment candidate winnowing out the others and rising to tackle Trump and Cruz. The short window until the next contest also exaggerates the tendency of candidates to hold on, hoping that to get through just one more state before breaking out to crush Trump. Jeb, for instance, wants to make it to Florida, but if he presses on even a little he could create an SEC bloodbath for all but Trump, which only heightens the problem. Trump’s people and organization are not so weak that he will falter by losing delegates from ballot access or similar mistakes. The media will not stop covering him so long as the ratings come, and it doesn’t take much to beat regular political coverage. While others will need to spend some time reloading with money Trump will be free of an entire part of the job. This is not to say Trump is certain to win the nomination, or even that you would take him against the field. But the idea that Trump has less than a 20% of getting it is missing out on what is going on in this race and does not take advantage of the data available. It may ultimately prove correct speculation. It isn’t data journalism.
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